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Surveillance at the Source
David Thawvi
Contemporary discussions concerning surveillance focus predominantly
on government activity. These discussions are important for a variety of
reasons, but they generally ignore a critical aspect of the surveillance-harn
calculus-the source from which government entities derive the information
they use. The source of surveillance data is the information "gathering"
activity itself which is where harms like "chilling" of speech and behavior
begin.
Unlike the days where satellite imaging, communications intercepts,
and other forms of information gathering were limited to advanced law
enforcement, military, and intelligence activities, private corporations now
play a dominant role in the collection of information about individuals'
activities. Private entities operate social networks, instant messaging, e-mail,
and other information systems, which now are the predominant means
through which people communicate. Private entities likewise control the
physical and wireless networks over which these systems communicate.
This short Article separates surveillance into information "gathering"
activities and information "usage" activities and examines the distinct,
standalone privacy-harming potential of each. It then argues that while
modern government surveillance focuses primarily on usage activities,
private corporations engage in information gathering activities and
separately use that information in their profitable business activity.
Additionally, the fact that they possess such information makes private
corporations a logical "feed" for information used in government
surveillance.
Profit-making efforts, unlike public functions, must advance the
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interests of shareholder return, and can only consider privacy or similar
concerns to the extent that those concerns are subject to regulation or can be
justified as market-competitive. This Article argues that since neither
exception is common, the primary incentives of private corporations are to
gather and use as much information as possible, thereby increasing the
probability of "chilUng effects."
Failure to examine the role of private corporations in surveillance
scholarship thus creates both an incomplete discussion of the harms of
government surveillance and fails to include an essential element of harm.
This Article briefly examines notable examples of contemporary surveillance
and argues for the inclusion ofprivate actors in surveillance-harm analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Discussions regarding the benefits and harms of government surveillance enjoy
a long history. The recent surge in legal scholarship and policy debate highlight
how these discussions combine the elements of surveillance activity and the parties
involved into a single "harm calculus" to debate what should and should not be
permissible. Doing so ultimately overlooks critical elements of that calculus, and
results in an incomplete discussion that fails to evaluate all the risks and benefits of
such activities.
Surveillance literature historically focused on government actors. Law
enforcement and intelligence community agencies would conduct surveillance and
act upon that information, within guidelines set by policymakers. Those guidelines
focused the debate on striking a proper balance between public services and
surveillance harms. This formulation made sense, perhaps, in the era when wiretaps
were operated by government agencies, government satellites conducted remote
imaging surveillance, and government personnel conducted line-of-sight
observations.
In the era of Big Data, however, where an electronic record of nearly every
action a user takes is retained by private sector entities, considering the various
elements of "surveillance" as a single merged activity is incomplete. This outdated
formulation conflates two critically-separable elements of surveillance: (1) gathering
of information, which is the collection of information used for analysis; and
(2) usage of information, which is the conduct of analysis on gathered information
to draw conclusions and inform actions and responses.
Failing to disambiguate these two elements makes scholarly and policy
discussions of the surveillance-harm calculus incomplete because it ignores the role
of private actors who are not subject to the same policy balancing mechanisms.
When the government performed both functions, we relied upon the existing
Constitutional framework to ensure that a balancing test occurred. With the
private sector having overtaken the vast majority of gathering activities, however,
the balancing equation is no longer complete. At best, the discussion fails to
include the balancing mechanism for private actors-a healthy, functioning market
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with adequate consumer choices. At worst, if the market fails, no balancing occurs
at all, and discussions of the surveillance-harm calculus likely provide a false sense
of resolution.
This Article puts forth two issues for consideration. First, that legal and policy
literature has failed to adequately consider surveillance in the context of its two
component activities -gathering and usage. Second, that this literature has failed
to address the role of private actors in the government surveillance-harm calculus.
It proceeds in two Parts. Part I addresses the lack of distinction between gathering
and usage and proposes a modest framework for consideration. Part II addresses
the role of private actors in surveillance. It juxtaposes traditional surveillance with
modern surveillance, identifies the roles of private actors, and compares the
balancing mechanisms for government and for private actors. It then identifies the
risks associated with an incomplete discussion of the surveillance-harm calculus.
This Article concludes by proposing a planned qualitative empirical project to
compare a more comprehensive set of surveillance activities, their respective
balancing mechanisms, and what gaps exist in current law to maintain the type of
balancing tests for surveillance our social framework anticipates.
I. GATHERING VS. USAGE
This Part begins with the assertion that surveillance should be separated into
two distinct types of activities for purposes of harm analysis. The first category
encompasses activities involving the gathering of information-the actual
"collecting" of data about individuals, organizations, governments, and their
activities. The second category encompasses activities involving the usage of
information-this can range from simple retention for administrative purposes to
targeted, comprehensive analysis designed to track and predict the most personal
and private aspects of an individual's life.
A brief review of the existing legal scholarship on privacy finds a curious lack of
discussion regarding this distinction. Some scholars have posited more fine-grained
distinctions among different types of surveillance as part of a categorical approach
ranging from collection, through processing, through various types of usage.' Such
approaches, while beneficial for other purposes, are too complex and thus not
well-matched to address the first-order problem of disambiguating gathering from
usage.
Perhaps the reason for this oversight stems from the historical tendency for the
same entities within the law enforcement/intelligence community to simultaneously
engage in both activities. Clearly, however, gathering is no longer limited to
government entities, and thus any discussion must first separate these activities by
the actors who conduct them. This Part proposes the "gathering vs. usage"
distinction, and explains its applicability to the context of contemporary
surveillance-harm analysis. It begins with a brief discussion of the potential harms
resulting from surveillance activities.
2 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 482-84 (2006).
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1. Surveillance Harms.-Legal scholarship historically focuses on two categories of
harm stemming from surveillance activities. In discussing these categories, I use
three terms: (1) the "gatherers"-those entities which collect, but do not necessarily
use, surveillance information; (2) the "watchers"-those entities that possess or
have access to surveillance information, regardless of whether they were the entities
engaged in the collection; and (3) the "subjects"-those entities whose identity,
characteristics, or activities are described in the surveillance information. There can
be overlap among these categories, particularly in the case of historically common
government surveillance.
The first category of harm involves a subject who is actually observed or who
perceives they may possibly be observed. This category proposes that such activity
or possibility will deter people from engaging in free and unfettered thought and
exploration. Rather, subjects will be driven to adopt mainstream beliefs and ideals,
a trend at odds with the free and open political discourse at the theoretical core of
the American political system. Collectively, these harms are often described as
"chilling effects," where the "chill" describes the deterrent on activities such as
speech and association.' These harms often are considered in conjunction with a
First Amendment analysis.s
The second category of harm focuses on the threat of or actual use of
surveillance information by authorities for unlawful purposes such as arbitrary
coercion, unlawful discrimination, and selective enforcement.' Unlike the first
category, this category describes a relationship in which the subject knows that the
watcher has, or can readily access, information actionable for these unlawful
purposes. In other words, the subject knows the watcher can use surveillance
information impermissibly, but alters their behavior or fails to do so and is directly
harmed as a result.
2. Harm-Based Distinction of Gathering from Usage.-These two categories of
harm historically described in privacy scholarship suggest the gathering-usage
distinction. This distinction additionally derives from the logical separation
between these activities-collection does not imply use (or the ability to use), and
usage does not imply the ability to have chosen what to collect or to further collect.
' See, e.g., Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for the
Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 2-4 (1998);
Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059,
1062-63 (2006); Stan Karas, Enhancing the Privacy Discourse: Consumer Information Gathering as
Surveillance, 7J. TECH. L. &POL'Y 29, 30-31 (2002); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance,
126 HARV. L. REv. 1934, 1934-36 (2013); Solove, supra note 2, at 488-89; K. A. Taipale, Technology,
Security and Privacy- The Fear of Frankenstein, the Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of lng
Ludd, 7YALEJ.L. &TECH. 123, 125, 129 (2004-2005).
Richards, supra note 2, at 1949; Solove, supra note 2, at 488; Taipale, supra note 2, at 146.
Richards, supra note 2, at 1950; Solove, supra note 2, at 515-16; Taipale, supra note 2, at 146.
6 Donohue, supra note 2, at 1192-93; Richards, supra note 2, at 1953-58; Solove, supra note 2, at
507-23; Taipale, supra note 2, at 150, 176.
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This Section proceeds by discussing gathering and usage in turn and then
concludes by linking that discussion to why the distinction is necessary.
3. Gathering Activities.-Gathering activities comprise those that acquire or
generate information about an entity's identity, characteristics, or behavior. While
often part of a comprehensive collection scheme with a specific usage purpose in
mind,' not all gathering falls into this category. Gathering, for example, may simply
be for administrative purposes, 8 such as toll-based wireless telephony.' Other
gathering activities may have a more data-driven purpose-collection of consumer
contact information to sell for marketing purposes, for example-but the entity
doing the gathering generally does not interact with the entity using the
information.10
In this regard, gathering is logically separable from use. The examples above
illustrate how entities may gather information usable for surveillance, but such
gathering activity has no intended relation to surveillance. This logical separation
becomes important in the context of the potential harm resulting from surveillance.
The relationship to the second category of harm above-unlawful threat or use of
surveillance information-is obvious, as gathering activities not linked to usage lack
the potential to cause this type of harm."
In contrast, the first type of harm-chilling effects--illustrates precisely why
gathering activities should be considered individually as a potential harm unto
themselves. As discussed above, chilling effects cases focus on the potential scope of
lawful activity that is deterred as a result of the potential or actual gathering of
information which might later be used in an actionable way-regardless of whether
' Consider, for example, online behavioral advertising activities. See, e.g., JOSEPH TUROW ET AL.,
CONTRARY TO WHAT MARKETERS SAY, AMERICANS REJECT TAILORED ADVERTISING AND
THREE ACTIVITIES THAT ENABLE IT (2009), available at https://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/bus
iness/20090929-TailoredAdvertising.pdf; see also infra Part I.B.3.
"Administrative purposes" generally entails gathering ancillary to, but necessary for, the provision
of a service.
' In re U.S for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611-12, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) ("[C]ell site
information is clearly a business record. The cell service provider collects and stores historical cell site
data for its own business purposes, perhaps to monitor or optimize service on its network or to
accurately bill its customers for the segments of its network that they use. . . . Because the magistrate
judge and district court treated the data as tracking information, they applied the wrong legal standard.
Using the proper framework, the SCA's authorization of § 2703(d) orders for historical cell site
information if an application meets the lesser 'specific and articulable facts' standard, rather than the
Fourth Amendment probable cause standard, is not per se unconstitutional.").
o In such cases, the dominant business model is for intermediate "clearinghouses" to match data
gatherers with data users. A similar model is used in selling advertising space based on Online
Behavioral Advertising information. DAVID THAW, NEHA GUPTA & ASHOK AGRAWALA,
PROPOSAL FOR A "DOwN-THE-CHAIN" NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT IN ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (2011), available atwww.researchgate.net/publication
/228419933-Proposal for a Down-the-Chain Notification-Requirement-in OnlineBehavioralAdv
ertisingResearch-andDevelopment/fde/9fcfd50dldf2al9cff.pdf.
" This is not to say that others may not use the information, but that is a separable type of harm
because it is conducted by a different entity, which may be subject to different public policy balancing
mechanisms.
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that information is ever actually used in an actionable way.12 In such cases, mere
gathering-even if only for the most innocuous, administrative purposes-has the
potential to deter lawful activity in a manner contrary to First Amendment and
other basic principles of American society.
This is not to say that gathering should be prohibited. Quite the contrary, this
Article takes no position on any particular case. Rather, the purpose is to illustrate
why gathering activities should be analyzed distinctly from usage activities, and
suggest the proper balancing mechanisms that can be applied to determine how the
potential harms of those activities relate to the potential benefits. This includes
considering whether the gathering is conducted by private or public entities, as each
is subject to a different balancing mechanism."
4. Usage Activities.-Usage activities comprise those in which information about
an entity's identity, characteristics, or behavior are accessed or analyzed for the
purpose of generating further information about a subject or taking action
regarding a subject. These definitions are deliberately broad, and encompass
activities traditionally described as "data processing," "data analysis," "data
aggregation," and "data retention."14 The core of these definitions however, is the
access to or analysis of information for the purpose of taking action regarding a
subject.
Following the analysis on gathering above in Section B.1., usage is logically
separable from gathering in that taking action regarding a subject on the basis of
some collected information necessarily implies access to or analysis of that
information. The link to the second category of harm is obvious--if surveillance
information is the basis of an unlawful action, and without that information the
watcher would have been unable to take the unlawful action, the subject would not
have been harmed by the surveillance. Such a harm does not necessarily occur-
surveillance information may be used for lawful purposes, or no actions may be
taken at alls--but its potential is sufficient to merit a distinct consideration of
usage activities.
5. The Argument for the Gathering-Usage Distinction.-A harms-oriented
analysis makes the strongest case for the gathering-usage distinction. The logical
12 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 630 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-91 (1965).
1 As discussed elsewhere, first-order American political theory relies on a functioning free market
(with appropriate regulatory oversight) to balance choices about private entities' surveillance activities,
whereas first-order American political theory relies on the policymaking process (with appropriate
judicial oversight) to balance choices about government entities' surveillance activities.
" All functions, for example, support the generation of further information about the subject and/or
other subjects.
" Some scholars have argued that the potential for analysis, even if it is not used to generate new
data or take action (i.e., the data is only viewed by the watcher) creates a chilling effect. This type of
chilling effect is orthogonal to the point of whether gathering and usage should be separated as
"view-only" effects would equally apply to both categories of information. See, e.g., Byford, supra note
2, at 14.
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distinctions form a foundation supporting the validity of analyzing gathering and
usage separately. Other separations, however, might also be logically valid. It is the
linkages between the categories of surveillance harms and the respective gathering
and usage activities that demonstrate the superiority of this gathering/usage
distinction.
Government surveillance historically included both gathering and usage
activities, with the private sector playing a limited role. If law enforcement needed
to tap a phone line, for example, the local incumbent telecommunications provider
would cooperate, but law enforcement officials would initiate and conduct the
surveillance. 1 Likewise, if the intelligence community wanted to track an
international criminal or terrorist across national borders, they would engage
government-owned and operated satellite surveillance systems, military resources,
intelligence operatives, and other resources. Thus, the gathering and usage
finctions historically were merged, at least inasmuch as most of the entities
engaged in the equation were governmental and few were private.
But times have changed. Part II of this Article discusses the increasing role the
private sector plays in the gathering of data, the differing incentives private entities
have for usage, and the "gaps" in the surveillance-harm calculus that result from
failing to consider the role of the private sector and from conflating gathering and
usage.
II. PRIVATE SURVEILLANCE
The role of private actors in government surveillance historically has been
under-examined in legal scholarship on privacy. This omission is more than a mere
curiosity because the mechanisms by which American society checks-and-balances
the behavior of private actors are fundamentally different than those used for
government activity. Now that private actors play a critical role in government
surveillance, the previous answer to whether adequate protections are in place to
balance the benefits and harms of surveillance must be reconsidered. This Part first
explores the role of private actors in contemporary government surveillance
activities. It then compares government and private actors in the context of
incentives for exploitation and mechanisms to prevent abuse.
1. The Increasing Role of the Private Sector.-A quick Google search for precisely
this question-the role of the private sector in government surveillance-reveals a
substantial amount of media attention regarding the subject. While perhaps an odd
data point from which to start, it is particularly telling, as this private sector tool for
conducting research is one of the very same tools actively engaged in surveillance
16 Note, by contrast, that in the case of "local usage directories" and long-distance calling records,
the private entities maintained this data for administrative purposes. However, not all local incumbent
telecommunications providers automatically retained local usage for administrative purposes. In certain
areas, for example, law enforcement would direct individuals to enter a special code after receiving a
threatening or harassing phone call, which would cause the local incumbent telecommunications
provider's system to "make a note" of the call when it otherwise might not.
2ol4-2ol5] 411
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gathering activities. The results will vary according to context-including the time,
and what information Google is able to discern about the user running the
query"-but several commonly leading results are quite telling of the trend.'"
While it is difficult to qualify with empirical validity due to the classified nature of
most historical government surveillance programs, the combination of recent
judicial review of government surveillance programs 9 and recent notable alleged
whistleblower disclosureS 20 suggests a rapid trend toward increased reliance by the
government on private actors for surveillance gathering activities.
This is not necessarily a bad thing, nor is the purpose of this Article to opine on
whether the private sector should have a role in government surveillance. While
harms such as those discussed in Part I certainly are risks with government
surveillance activities, those activities also may produce important benefits in the
areas of public health, national security, law enforcement, and economic regulation.
It may well be that the private sector, particularly in the age of Big Data, is better
suited than the government to be the primary actor engaged in gathering activities.
The private sector, however, is subject to a different set of balancing
mechanisms to ensure that its activities are consistent with the expectations of
society. Whereas government relies on the political process (with appropriate
judicial oversight), the private sector relies on a healthy, functioning free market
with adequate consumer choices (with appropriate regulatory oversight).
Consideration of the traditional political process alone, therefore, is insufficient to
ensure adequate analysis of the cost/benefit tradeoffs of contemporary surveillance.
This short Article does not discuss the details of specific examples of private
sector participation in government surveillance. While adequate disclosures of
certain classified programs may exist, it is not the details of the programs that are
central to the thesis of this piece. Rather, this Article lays out an analytical
framework suggesting that there is an oversight in existing literature and why that
" This fact in itself is revealing of surveillance-both gathering and usage-being conducted by the
private sector for its own purposes. For more information on Google's search results, see Adam
Rosenthal, Why Google's Search Results Vay from Person to Person, MICROARTS (June 21, 2013),
http://microarts.com/launchabrand/why-googles-search-results-vary-from-person-to-person.
s See generally Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age: Rep. of the
Office of the UN. High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HR
C.27.37-en.pdf (reporting on the protection and promotion of the right to privacy in the context of
domestic and extraterritorial surveillance); BEATRICE EDWARDS, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN
CORPORATE SECURITY STATE (2014) (discussing reasons to fear corporate surveillance); Julian
Chokkattu, U.N Says Governments Are Increasingly Relying on Private Sector for Surveillance,
TECHCRUNCH (July 16, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/16/u-n (discussing the U.N's fears that
digital surveillance will escape governmental control); Mark Karlin, Six Reasons to be Afraid of the
Private Sector/Government Security State, TRUTHOUT (May 16, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://
truth-out.org/opinion/item/23728 (discussing privacy and surveillance by the private sector).
" See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012); In re U.S for Historical Cell Site
Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cit. 2012).
' See generally Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/worldlinteractive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance
-revelations-decoded (examining the files uncovered by Edward Snowden).
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oversight makes discussions of surveillance harms incomplete.21
2. Government vs. Private Cost/Benefit Analyses.-These cost/benefit tradeoffs
form the core of the central argument of this Article-that existing discussions of
the surveillance-harm calculus are incomplete. The premise for this claim is that
public and private sector entities have different incentives to engage in surveillance
and that they are subject to different balancing mechanisms to weigh those
cost/benefit tradeoffs. This Section explores these differences and highlights the
incomplete aspects of a surveillance-harm discussion that under-appreciates the
private sector's role in government surveillance.
3. Government Surveillance (Incentives and Balancing Mechanisms).-
Government incentives for surveillance primarily stem from public services that
require or can be improved by better information about individual or organizational
attributes and conduct. Classic examples include public health, national security,
law enforcement, and economic policy. Public health is a particularly useful starting
point because the tradeoff is less politically controversial than national security or
law enforcement-in the modern era, gathering information about the travel habits
of individuals exposed to a deadly virus is comparatively less controversial than are
terrorism watch lists. Such gathering is limited in scope, the usage of the
information is limited in scope, the gathering generally is done openly, and the
opportunities for abuse are comparatively limited because the information is subject
to substantial public scrutiny. Such gathering is not without controversy, however,
as certain transmission vectors-such as intimate contact in the case of sexually
transmitted infections-may include far more sensitive information than people are
comfortable being compelled to share. Additionally, the potential for abuse of such
information generally is greater than with less intimate information such as travel
habits.
National security and law enforcement contexts produce comparatively high
levels of debate. Since September 11, 2001, government anti-terrorism surveillance
activity has increased dramatically, presenting the challenge of balancing the
prevention of potentially massive loss-of-life with the protection civil liberties.2 2
Contrary to public health, the incentives for law enforcement and intelligence
agencies are to gather as much information as possible and to make the most
comprehensive use of it. These goals are aligned with the prevention and
prosecution of terrorist and other criminal activities. Also in contrast to public
health, such surveillance generally is conducted in secret both to preserve the
integrity of the investigative process and to increase the likelihood of success in
detecting unlawful activities that actors seek to conceal. This secrecy and the nature
and scope of the information collected make it ripe for abuse because reduced
21 The particulars of the programs are more appropriate for the planned second piece in this series,
which will include an empirical analysis of those programs, private sector programs, and a comparison of
the balancing mechanisms in place to address surveillance cost/benefit tradeoffs for each activity.
' See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
2014-2015]1 413
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transparency likewise reduces the probability of abuse being detected, thus reducing
one important deterrent against abuse.
This brief analysis highlights two key aspects of government surveillance
activities. First, that the policymaking process is the mechanism for balancing
privacy interests and public goals. The elected legislatures and executive(s) of the
states and the federal government are responsible for directing and overseeing the
activities of these organizations with appropriate additional oversight by the judicial
system. Second, that the primary incentives are public ones, such as the protection
of public health and prevention of criminal activity, not private ones, such as
profit-making. While the nature of these incentives by no means obviates the need
for oversight and balancing mechanisms to protect against surveillance harms, the
inherent goals are at least aligned with valid public interests, as different from
private sector entities.
4. Private Surveillance (Incentives and Balancing Mechanisms).-Private
incentives for surveillance stem primarily from instrumental incentives and
direct-profit incentives. Instrumental incentives include surveillance activities that a
private entity must conduct in order to deliver its primary good or service.
Direct-profit incentives include surveillance activities that a private entity conducts
for the value of the data gathered itself, whether directly or for enhancing the value
of other products or services.
An example of an instrumental incentive is the use of wireless telephone records
as to a subscriber's location, phone numbers called, and time and duration of calls.
All of this information is necessary in order to create and maintain accurate billing
records and must be gathered as an instrumental matter regardless of whether the
carrier intends on otherwise monetizing it. An example of a direct-profit incentive,
by contrast, is the collection of a user's web browsing habits across multiple
websites by an online behavioral advertising network. Although the delivery of
targeted advertising does not, as a mathematical matter, strictly require collecting
information about a user's web browsing habits, the industry asserts that such
gathering and usage greatly enhances the accuracy of the targeting and thus
increases its effective value to potential marketers. 23
While these two incentives are different in certain respects, they share a
common important distinction from government surveillance activities-both have
a primary purpose of supporting the profit-making enterprise of a private
organization. Neither has a public service as its primary goal. While it is true that
many private companies are filling historically public roles, particularly in recent
years, the structure of corporate law creates a fiduciary duty for profit-making
23 See THAW, GUPTA & AGRAWALA , supra note 10, at 1; see also Understanding Online
Advertising: FrequentlyAsked Questions, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www.network
advertising.org/faq (last visited Jan 26, 2014).
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enterprises to deliver optimal profit to their shareholders.24
The mechanism for balancing the beneficial behaviors of private
organizations-in this case, defined as profit-making-against potential harms is a
free, functioning healthy marketplace with consumer choice and appropriate
regulatory supervision. Similar to the incentives, this mechanism is also very
different from that for balancing government-beneficial activities against potential
harms.
Whereas a functioning legislative and executive policymaking balancing
mechanism has certain requisite elements, such as universal suffrage and other
elements of adequate participation in the political process, a functioning free
market as a balancing mechanism has fundamentally different requisite elements.
Two of these elements are relevant to consideration of the surveillance-harm
calculus. First, the market must be functioning properly-that is, consumers must
be able to express their preferences through purchase choices. When other
variables, such as switching costs, 25 obstruct that preference expression, the market
no longer performs a balancing function because organizations are not incentivized
to alter their products based on consumer preferences if it is otherwise too difficult
for consumers to switch to an alternative (or if one does not exist because barriers
to entry are too high). Second, even assuming consumers are able to express
' See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business corporation
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are
to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes."). While
Dodge deals primarily with Michigan law, this is often considered the leading case on the subject across
jurisdictions. See Stephen Bainbridge, Case Law on the Fiduciary Duty of Directors to Maximize the
Wealth of Corporate Shareholders, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 5, 2012, 12:18 PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/05/case-law-on-the-fiduciary-duty-
of-directors-to-maximize-the-wealth-of-corporate-shareholders.html.
25 Jacques Cr6mer & Gary Biglaiser, Switching Costs and Network Effects in Competition Policy,
in RECENT ADVANCES IN THE ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION POLICY AND REGULATION 13, 13
(Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Yannis Katsoulacos, eds., 2012) ("Using a social networking site that does
not have any other users does not increase one's utility. . . . Consumers will hesitate to 'leave' an
incumbent, even to migrate to an entrant which offers lower prices and/or better quality, as they fear
that they will lose the benefits . . . ."); Juan Pablo Maicas et. al., The Role of (Personal) Network Effects
and Switching Costs in Determining Mobile Users' Choice, 24 J. INFO. TECH. 160, 160 (2009),
available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jit/journal/v24/n2/abs/jit200835a.html ("[P]ersonal
network effects and switching costs play a key role in determining mobile users' choice: the probability
that a customer selects a mobile phone company increases with the number of members of her social
network already subscribed to that firm, and switching costs are significantly present in the mobile
phone market making switching providers costly."); Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff, Google,
Facebook, Amazon, eBay- Is the Internet Driving Competition or Market Monopolization? 7 (DICE
Discussion Paper No. 83, 2013), available atwww.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/68229/1/73435858X.pd
f ("[C]osts between social networks such as Facebook are generally much higher because .. . the number
of users is a very important factor for users' utility."); Irina Suleymanova & Christian Wey, Bertrand
Competition in Markets with Network Effects and Switching Costs 2 (DICE Discussion Paper No. 30,
2011), available at www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48679/1/665466420.pdf; Ming-Chien Lin,
Investigate the Impact of Inertia Formation on The New System Acceptance-An Empirical Study of
Social Network Sites (July 16, 2013) (unpublished Master's thesis), available at
http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view-etd?URN=etd-0616113-215318.
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preferences about a product at all, other variables such as price, functionality, and
"The Next Big Thing"26 tend to dominate consumer decisions over functions such
as privacy 7 and security.28
It is worth noting that in recent months, companies such as Apple, 29
Microsoft," and Google3 ' have responded to the trend in government requests for
information by offering products designed to allow users to encrypt their own
mobile devices in a manner these vendors claim will lock the vendors themselves
out of the devices. Although the existence of these products appears to counter the
proposition that "consumers are unable to express privacy preferences," a few things
are worth noting regarding such assertions.
First, these technologies have existed for many years, and in fact, in many cases
the advertised "change" is simply to enable those features to be active by default as
opposed to lay users making potentially confusing changes to technical settings in
their devices.32 Thus, the original preference expressed by the market was less likely
to be consumers responding to government surveillance revelations (since those
revelations had not yet occurred) and was more likely to be a response to demands
by large organizational clients to provide encryption for data security compliance
purposes." Second, responding to government requests for surveillance information
is an expensive, time-consuming process for service providers. By locking
themselves out of access to information, they can substantially reduce their own
costs. It may well be the case that this is one example where public and private
interests happen to align,3 4 however, in the context of a balancing mechanism to
ensure privacy and surveillance concerns are properly considered, happenstance is
not sufficient to protect against potential harms.
26 Samsung, Samsung Galaxy S II (The Nexr Big Thing) Commercial, YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2011)
http://www.youtube.com/watchlv=GWnunavN4bQ
" James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making Strategies and the
Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &POLY 1, 1-2 (2005).
2 Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of Information Security- A Survey and Open
Questions, 314 SCIENCE 610, 611 (2006) ("Consumers generally reward vendors for adding features,
for being first to market, or for being dominant in an existing market ... . These motivations clash with
the task of writing more secure software, which requires time-consuming testing and a focus on
simplicity.").
2 Tom Gillis, Apple's iOS 8 Lets Users Just "Trust the Math", FORBES (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:50 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgillis/2014/10/14/apples-ios-8-lets-users-just-trust-the-math.
30 Lou Shipley, Why the Future of Digital Security Is Open, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/why-the-fiuture-of-digital-security-is-open/ar-BB9uSk2.
3 Danny Yadron & Rolfe Winkler, Google to Encrypt Phone Data in Android, WALL ST. J.:
DIGITS (Sept. 18, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/09/18/google-to-encrypt-phone
-data-in-android.
3 Craig Timberg, Newest Androids WillJoin iPhones in Offering Default Encryption, Blocking
Police, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/
18/newest-androids.
* David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287, 321 (2014)
("[T]he security investment is moved essentially to crypto. Just encrypt as much as you can. Whatever it
takes, just encrypt it. If it moves, encrypt it. If it stays there, encrypt it.).
' A useful circumstance that I discuss the benefits of elsewhere. See David Thaw, Enlightened
Regulatory Capture, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 329, 332-33 (2014).
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CONCLUSION
The result is a circumstance in which the discussion about how to balance the
public benefits of surveillance against the potential harms is undoubtedly
insufficient and does not consider all of the relevant factors. This Article does not
argue for or against government surveillance-rather, it focuses on the fact that
whatever conclusion is reached, if that conclusion fails to separate gathering from
usage activities in analysis of surveillance, or fails to include the role of the private
sector, that discussion is necessarily incomplete. It is incomplete in the former
instance because it fails to recognize the different purposes and resultant harms
associated with each category of surveillance activity. It is incomplete in the latter
instance because it assumes that one type of balancing mechanism-the
policymaking process for government oversight-will be adequate to "spill-over"
onto the behaviors of the private sector. This is an assumption with far too much
risk given the potential harms at stake. Therefore, a proper analysis requires
empirical investigation of the categories of activities and of the actual and potential
harms among different types of surveillance activities. 35
s In the next piece in this series, I plan to construct a matrix of these activities and the applicable
oversight mechanisms and use the framework from this Article to describe what are the likely harms of
each type of surveillance program and what a "complete" discussion of each cost/benefit analysis would
require.
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